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Abstract 
The Friedman rule is strongly immune to most model modifications although it has not actually 
been observed. The Friedman rule implicitly assumes that a government is perfectly under the 
control of the representative household. This paper shows that, if a government is not perfectly 
under the control of the representative household, but also pursues political objectives, the 
optimal quantity of money generally is accompanied by positive nominal interest and inflation 
rates through the simultaneous optimization of government and the representative household. 
The fact that nominal interest and inflation rates are usually positive conversely implies that a 
government usually pursues political objectives. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
     The well-known Friedman rule requires that the nominal interest rate be zero and thereby 
the rate of inflation be negative (see Friedman,1969). Needless to say, nominal interest and 
inflation rates actually have been positive in most countries and in most time periods, 
particularly in the period of fiat money after WWII. Very high nominal interest and inflation 
rates have not been rare. Rather, even in the current low inflation environment, an inflation rate 
of about 2% has been widely regarded as “desirable.” This “2% solution” indicates that, if the 
real interest rate is 4%, the “desirable” inflation rate is 6 percentage points higher than the 
“optimal” Friedman inflation rate. These facts therefore suggest that the quantity of money is 
usually not at the optimal level in the sense of the Friedman rule and make the Friedman rule 
greatly less compelling. 
     The Friedman rule, however, is strongly immune to most model modifications and is still 
thought to be basically correct. Phelps (1973), however, argued that, if distortionary taxes are 
levied, the Friedman rule is not always optimal. Since Phelps (1973), many economists have 
pursued this possibility, but the effect of distortionary taxes is presently regarded as 
quantitatively insufficient to insist that the Friedman rule is not correct; thus, the optimal 
inflation tax is probably not far from the Friedman rule (e.g., Lucas, 1994; Chari, Cristiano, and 
Kehoe, 1996; Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1997). On the other hand, some economists have 
argued that mild inflation may have some benefits in a stochastic environment (e.g., because of 
short-run rigidity in nominal wages) (see e.g., Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry, 2000). If such 
benefits really exist, the Friedman rule may not always be desirable. Critics have countered, 
however, that this explanation is inconsistent with the rational behavior of households. Even 
though some kind of rigidity may exist, many economists doubt that its effect is so large as to 
offset the aforementioned discrepancy between the “desirable” and “optimal” inflation rates 
(e.g., Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2005). As a result, many economists believe that the Friedman 
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rule is approximately correct. Nevertheless, the question remains unanswered: why hasn’t the 
theoretically optimal Friedman rule actually been observed across time periods and countries?1 
     On the other hand, the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) has questioned the quantity 
theory of money on which the Friedman rule is based.2 If the quantity theory of money is not an 
appropriate theory to describe the actual world, it may be reasonable that the Friedman rule is 
not observed. However, many economists are skeptical about the FTPL. A reason for this 
skepticism may be that the concept of non-Ricardian policy is too general and thus 
non-Ricardian policies allows too many fiscal policy rules, many of which may be unrealistic 
and lead to unfavorable and unacceptable consequences. This generality may give the 
impression that the FTPL is an extreme theory, merely a meaningless and useless gimmick. As a 
result, the FTPL is not currently regarded as sufficiently satisfactory to be replaced with the 
quantity theory of money. 
     Nevertheless, the FTPL provides us a hint for the answer to the question of why the 
theoretically optimal Friedman rule has not actually been observed. The central concept of the 
FTPL is that a government does not necessarily care about economic utilities of households. 
This concept implies that, if a government is an institution that is independent of households and 
pursues political objectives, the Friedman rule may not be “optimal” because households will 
behave rationally and optimally under the constraint that the government does not necessarily 
implement the Friedman rule. 3  Contrary to the FTPL, only the optimization of the 
                                                          
1 Recently, Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Martin (2005) argued another possibility that heterogeneity of agents plays an 
important role in explaining why the Friedman rule does not maximize ex post steady-state welfare. 
2 Advocates of the FTPL are Leeper (1991), Sims (1994, 1998, 2001), Woodford (1995, 2001), and Cochrane (1998a, 
1998b, 2005). Critics to the theory include Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999), McCallum (2001, 2003), Buiter (2002, 
2004), and Niepelt (2004). See also Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000), Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000), and Gordon and 
Leeper (2002). 
3 For simplicity, this paper assumes that a central bank is not independent of government and thus the central bank 
and government are regarded as a combined institution, not separate independent institutions.  
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representative households’ economic objectives is considered by the Friedman rule, and the 
optimization of a government’s political objectives is neglected because a government is 
assumed to be perfectly under the control of the representative household. The government is 
not considered to be an independent active agent but merely a “robot” owned by the 
representative household; thus, it has no independent will and does not optimize its own utilities 
but completely obeys the representative household to maximize the representative household’s 
economic utilities. The Friedman rule therefore is always optimal for the representative 
household because the representative household who demands money also supplies money via 
the government. The representative household can print money freely as long as it wants (i.e., 
money is not a scarce resource for the representative household). In this environment, it is 
optimal for the representative household to supply money up to the saturation point. This nature 
of the Friedman rule implies that the Friedman rule is always optimal, unless we assume a 
government has an independent will and is not perfectly under the control of the representative 
household.  
     Phelps (1973) argues that the Friedman rule is not always optimal in the case of 
distortionary taxes. The introduction of distortionary taxes into models is an example of 
assuming a government that has an independent will and that is not perfectly under the control 
of the representative household. The government levies distortionary taxes even if the 
representative household dislikes this practice because of inefficiency caused by distortionary 
taxes. Distortionary taxes therefore imply that the government is not perfectly under the control 
of the representative household. Distortionary taxes may be levied for political reasons, for 
example, to redistribute wealth among people and to enhance political stability. Heterogeneity 
of households has the same effect as distortionary taxes (e.g., Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Martin, 
2005). A government can be under the control of one type of household, but the behavior of the 
government is automatically exogenous for any other type of household. Hence, the government 
is not perfectly under the control of the representative household.  
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     The above arguments on distortionary taxes and heterogeneous households suggest that, if 
a government acts independently from the representative household, there is the possibility that 
positive nominal interest and inflation rates are optimal.4 However, these arguments only focus 
on one aspect of the government’s independent will and, as was mentioned above, the effect of 
distortionary taxes is not thought to be sufficiently large to offset the Friedman rule. A 
government’s independent will may not be limited to distortionary taxes or segmented actions to 
heterogeneous households. They may also include broader activities that originate in the deeper 
political motives of government. To answer the question of why the theoretically optimal 
Friedman rule has not actually been observed across different time periods and countries 
therefore requires more comprehensive and explicit modeling of the independent political will 
of government. My purpose here is to construct such a model of government and to present an 
alternative explanation for the question. The model constructed in this paper indicates that, with 
simultaneous optimization of the representative household and government, the optimal quantity 
of money is generally accompanied by positive nominal interest and inflation rates. This result 
shows a very different picture from the one the Friedman rule gives, but it seems quite natural 
because nominal interest and inflation rates are generally positive.  
     The paper is organized as follows. In section II, a model is constructed assuming a 
Leviathan government in which the representative household maximizes its economic utility 
and the government also simultaneously maximizes its political utility. In section III, the nature 
of simultaneous optimization of the representative household and the government is examined, 
and the law of motion for price as a result of the simultaneous optimization is shown. Section IV 
shows that, with the simultaneous optimization, the optimal quantity of money is generally 
accompanied by positive nominal interest and inflation rates. Concluding remarks are offered in 
                                                          
4 Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) argue another possibility--unless the social planner has access to a direct 100% tax 
on monopoly profits, he will always find it optimal to deviate from the Friedman rule. The key here is the friction that 
the social planner cannot levy a direct 100% tax on monopoly profits even if households want it. 
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section V. 
 
II. THE MODEL 
 
1. The government budget constraint 
     The budget constraint of a government in the model in this paper is 
tttttt SXGRBB −−+=& , 
where Bt is the accumulated nominal government bonds, Rt is the nominal interest rate for 
government bonds, Gt is nominal government expenditure, Xt is nominal tax revenue, and St is 
the nominal amount of seigniorage at time t. The tax is assumed to be lump sum. All variables 
are expressed in per capita terms. The government bonds are long-term, and the returns on the 
bonds, Rt, are realized only after the bonds are held during a unit period, say a year. Government 
bonds are redeemed in a unit period, and the government successively refinances the bonds by 
issuing new ones at each time. Rt is composed of the real interest rate rt and the expected change 
of the bonds’ price by inflation e tbπ ,  such that 
e
tbtt πrR ,+= . Let 
t
t
t p
Bb = , 
t
t
t p
Gg = , 
t
t
t p
Xx = , and 
t
t
t p
Ss = , where pt is the price level at time t. Let also 
t
t
t p
p
π
&=  be the 
inflation rate at time t. By dividing by pt, the budget constraint is transformed to  
ttttt
t
t sxgRb
p
B −−+=& , 
which is equivalent to  
( ) tttttttttttttt sxgπRbπbsxgRbb −−+−=−−−+=& . 
     Because the returns on government bonds are realized only after holding the bonds during 
a unit period, investors buy the bonds if ( )dsrπER t
t tstt ∫ + +≥ 1  at time t where tR  is the 
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nominal interest rate for bonds bought at t. Hence, by arbitrage, ( )dsrπER t
t tstt ∫ + += 1  and 
t
t
t stt
rdsπER += ∫ +1  if rt is constant (i.e., if it is at steady state). This equation means that, 
during a sufficiently small period between t and t + dt, the government’s obligation to pay for 
the bonds’ return in the future increases not by tπdt  but by dsπEdt
t
t st ∫ +1 . Because 
ttt
t
t stttttttt
BrdsπEBRBB ,
1
,,1, ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +==− ∫ ++  where 1, +ttB is the value of bonds at time t + 1, 
which was issued at time t, then ttt
t
t sttt
BrdsπEB ,
1
, ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ += ∫ +& . If πt is constant, then 
ttt
t
t sttt
BrdsπEB ,
1
, ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ += ∫ +& ( ) tttttt BrπB ,, +=⇔ & , but if πt is not constant, they are not necessarily 
equivalent.5 
     Because bonds are redeemed in a unit period and successively refinanced, the bonds the 
government is holding at t are composed of bonds issued between t - 1 and t. Hence, under 
perfect foresight, the average nominal interest rate for the total government bonds at time t is the 
weighted sum of tR  such that =⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
= ∫ ∫− −
ds
dvB
B
RR
t
t t
t tv
ts
st 1
1 ,
,
t
t
t t
t tv
tss
s v
rds
dvB
B
dvπ +⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∫ ∫∫− −
+
1
1 ,
,1 . 
If the weights 
∫ −tt tv
ts
dvB
B
1 ,
,  between t - 1 and t are not so different from each other, then 
approximately t
t
t
s
s vt
rdsdvπR += ∫ ∫− +1 1 .6 The average nominal interest rate for the total 
                                                          
5 ( ) tttttt BrπB ,, +=& has been used for many analyses because πt is usually assumed to be constant. 
6 More precisely, if πt is constant, then ttt
t
t
s
s vt
rπrdsdvπR +=+= ∫ ∫− +1 1  for any set of weights. If πt is 
increasing, then 
t
t
t
s
s vt
t
t t
t tv
tss
s vt
rdsdvπrds
dvB
B
dvπR +>+⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
= ∫ ∫∫ ∫∫ −
+
−
−
+
1
1
1
1 ,
,1  in general because if 
new bonds are issued at t only for refinancing the redeemed bonds, then ( ) 1,11, 1 −−−+= ttttt BRB . In addition, if πt 
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government bonds, therefore, develops by t
t
t
s
s vt
rdsdvπR += ∫ ∫− +1 1 . Here, if approximately 
wt
t
t s
πdsπ +
+ =∫ 1  for some constant ( )10 ≤≤ ww  for any t (i.e., if dsπtt s∫ +1  is represented by 
wtπ +  for any t), then t
t
t
s
s vt
rdsdvπR += ∫ ∫− +1 1 twt wt s rdsπ += ∫ + +−1 ; thus, approximately eb,tπ  
indicates a total price change by inflation during a unit period. If tπ  is constant, then 
t
t
t
s
s v
e
tb πdsdvππ == ∫ ∫− +1 1, , but if tπ  is not constant, te tb ππ =,  does not necessarily hold. The 
equation t
e
tb ππ =,  is merely a special case of e tbπ , .  
 
2. An economically Leviathan government  
     A Leviathan government is assumed in the model in this paper.7 As is known well, there 
are two extremely different views regarding government’s behavior in the literature on political 
economy: the Leviathan view and the benevolent view (e.g., Downs, 1957; Brennan and 
Buchanan, 1980; Alesina and Cukierman, 1990). In a Leviathan government, politicians have 
their own preferences in responding to policy issues. In a benevolent government, politicians 
desire to behave in accordance with the will of voters, which also ensures that they will be 
reelected. In the Leviathan view, a government prioritizes pursuing its political objectives 
whereas, in the benevolent view, a government maximizes the same economic utility as the 
representative household.  
     From an economic point of view, a benevolent government maximizes the expected 
economic utility of the representative household but a Leviathan government does not. Unlike a 
benevolent government, a Leviathan government is therefore not managed by politically neutral 
                                                                                                                                                                          
is increasing, t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπ >∫ ∫− +1 1 ; thus, ttttt ss vt rπrdsdvπR +>+> ∫ ∫− +1 1 . Nevertheless, if weights 
are nearly equal, then approximately t
t
t
s
s vt
rdsdvπR += ∫ ∫− +1 1 . 
7 The most prominent reference to Leviathan governments is Brennan and Buchanan (1980). 
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bureaucrats who are obligated to mechanically maximize the expected economic utility of the 
representative household at any time and under any political party. It is instead managed by 
politicians who have strong political wills to achieve their own political objectives by all 
means.8 Hence, while the expenditure of a benevolent government is a tool used to maximize 
the economic utility of the representative household, the expenditure of a Leviathan government 
is a tool used to achieve the government’s policy objectives. For instance, if a Leviathan 
government considers national security to be the most important political issue, defense 
spending will increase greatly compared with the case in which a government sees defense as a 
low priority. If improvement of social welfare is the top priority, however, spending on social 
welfare will increase dramatically compared with the case in which a government sees social 
welfare as a low priority. 
     Is it possible, however, for a Leviathan government to hold office for a long period? It is 
possible if both economic and political points of view are considered. The majority of people 
will support a Leviathan government even though they know that the government does not 
necessarily pursue only the economic objectives of the representative household because people 
choose a government for both economic and political reasons. A government is generally 
chosen by the median of households under a proportional representation system, but the 
representative household usually presumed in the economics literature is basically the mean 
household.9 Therefore, the economically representative household is not usually identical to the 
politically representative household. In other words, the Leviathan government argued here is an 
                                                          
8 The government behavior assumed in the FTPL reflects an aspect of a Leviathan government. Christiano and 
Fitzgerald (2000) argue that non-Ricardian policies correspond to the type of policies in which governments are 
viewed as selecting policies and committing themselves to those policies in advance of prices being determined in 
markets. 
9 See the literature on the median voter theorem (e.g., Downs 1957). Also see the literature on the delay in reforms 
(e.g., Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992; Alesina and Drazen 1991). 
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economically Leviathan government that maximizes the political utility of people whereas the 
conventional economically benevolent government maximizes the economic utility of people.  
     The Leviathan view generally requires the explicit inclusion of government expenditure, 
tax revenue, or related activities in the political utility function of government (e.g., Edwards 
and Keen, 1996). A Leviathan government derives political utility from expenditure for its 
political purposes. Hence, the larger the expenditure is, the happier the Leviathan government 
will be. On the other hand, the Leviathan government knows that raising tax rates will provoke 
people’s antipathy and reduce the probability of being reelected, which makes the government 
uncomfortable because it expects that it cannot expend money to achieve its purposes if it loses 
power. The Leviathan government may regard taxes as necessary costs to obtain freedom of 
expenditure for its own purposes. Expenditure and taxes in the political utility function of the 
government are analogous to consumption and labor hours in the economic utility function of 
the household. Consumption and labor hours are both control variables, and as such, the 
government’s expenditure and tax revenue are also control variables. As a whole, the political 
utility function of government can be expressed as ( )ttG x,gu .10 In addition, it can be assumed 
based on the previously mentioned arguments that 0>∂
∂
t
G
g
u  and 02
2
<∂
∂
t
G
g
u , and 0<∂
∂
t
G
x
u and 
02
2
>∂
∂
t
G
x
u .11 A Leviathan government therefore maximizes the expected sum of these utilities 
                                                          
10 It is possible to assume that governments are partially benevolent. In this case the utility function of a government 
can be assumed to be ( )ttttG l,c,x,gu , where tc is real consumption and tl  is the leisure hours of the 
representative household. However, if a lump-sum tax is imposed, the government’s policies do not affect 
steady-state consumption and leisure hours. In this case, the utility function can be assumed to be ( )ttG x,gu . 
11 Some may argue that it is more likely that 0>∂
∂
t
G
x
u and 02
2
<∂
∂
t
G
x
u . However, the assumption used is not an 
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discounted by its time preference rate. A Leviathan government pursues political objectives 
under the constraint of deficit financing. As a whole, an economically Leviathan government 
should maximize its expected political utility subject to the budget constraint. 
 
3. Optimization problems 
 3.1 The representative household 
     The well-known money in utility model of Sidrauski (1967) is used for the optimization 
problem of the representative household. The representative household maximizes expected 
economic utility 
Max ( ) ( )dttθm,cuE PttP −∫∞ exp00  
subject to  
( ) ( )[ ] tttttttttt gmrπczwara −++−++=& , 
where Pu  and Pθ  are the utility function and the rate of time preference of the representative 
household, mt is real money, wt is real wage, zt is real government transfers, gt is real 
government expenditure, zt is lump-sum real government transfers, ct is real consumption, πt is 
the inflation rate, ttt mka += , and kt is real capital. All variables are expressed in per capita 
terms. It is also assumed that ( )tt kfr ′= , ( ) ( )tttt kfkkfw ′−= , 0>'uP , 0<"uP , 
( ) 0>∂
∂
t
ttP
m
m,cu , and ( ) 02
2
<∂
∂
t
ttP
m
m,cu  where ( )⋅f  is the production function. Population is 
assumed to be constant. The budget constraint means that the output ( )tkf  in each period is 
demanded for private consumption ct, private investment tk& , and government expenditure gt. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
important issue here because 
( )
( ) 0
2
2
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
x
x
x
,xgu
x
,xgux &  at steady state, as will be shown in solving the optimization 
problem later in the paper. Thus, the results are not affected by which assumption is used.  
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Government expenditure gt is an exogenous variable for the representative household because it 
is a Leviathan government. For simplicity, the central bank is not assumed to be independent of 
the government; thus, the functions of the government and central bank are not separated. It is 
also assumed that lump-sum government transfers zt is equal to the seigniorage st, and that, 
although all households receive transfers from a government in equilibrium, when making 
decisions, each household takes the amount it receives as given, independent of its money 
holdings. 
 
 3.2 An economically Leviathan government 
     An economically Leviathan government also simultaneously maximizes its expected 
political utility. The utility function, Gu , of an economically Leviathan government is a 
constant relative risk aversion utility function. The government’s rate of time preference is Gθ . 
The optimization problem of the government is  
( ) ( )dttθ,xguEMax GttG −∫∞ exp00  
subject to  
( ) ttttttt sxgπRbb −−+−=& . 
The government maximizes its expected political utility considering the behavior of the 
representative household that is reflected in Rt in its budget constraint.12 
     Note that the time preference rate of government Gθ  is not necessarily identical to the 
time preference rate of the representative household Pθ . This heterogeneity plays an important 
role later in this study. The rates of time preference are different because of the following: (1) a 
government is chosen from among many political parties from economic and political points of 
view whereas the time preference rate of the representative household is related only to 
                                                          
12 The model can be used to analyze inflation (see Harashima 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). 
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economic activities; (2) a government is usually chosen by the median of households under a 
proportional representation system and the converged policy reflects the median voter—not the 
mean voter—while an economically representative household is basically the mean household;13 
(3) even though people want to choose a government that has the same time preference rate as 
the representative household, the rates may differ owing to errors in expectations (e.g., Alesina 
and Cukierman, 1990); and (4) current voters cannot bind the choices of future voters and, if 
current voters are aware of this possibility that they cannot bind future voters, they may vote 
more myopically as compared with their own rates of impatience in private economic activities 
(e.g., Tabellini and Alesina, 1990). Hence, it seems that the rates of time preference of 
government and the representative household should usually be heterogeneous. It should be also 
noted, however, that even though the rates of time preference are heterogeneous, a Leviathan 
government behaves based only on its own time preference rate, without hesitation. 
 
III. SIMULTANEOUS OPTIMIZATION 
 
1. The simultaneous optimization of government and the representative household 
     First, the optimization problem of the representative household is examined. Let 
Hamiltonian PH  be ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ttttttttttP,PttPP gmrπczwarλtθm,cuH −+−−+++−= exp , 
where tP,λ  is a costate variable, ct and mt are control variables, and at is a state variable. The 
optimality conditions for the representative household are  
(1) ( ) ( ) tP,P
t
ttP λtθ
c
m,cu =−∂
∂ exp , 
(2) ( ) ( ) ( )tttP,P
t
ttP rπλtθ
m
m,cu +=−∂
∂ exp , 
                                                          
13 See the literature on the median voter theorem (e.g., also Downs 1957), and also see the literature on the delay in 
reforms (e.g., Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992; Alesina and Drazen 1991). 
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(3) ttP,tP, rλλ −=& ,      
(4) ( ) ( )[ ]ttttttttt gmrπczwraa −++−++=& , and       
(5) 0lim =∞→ ttP,t aλ .    
By conditions (1) and (2), 
( )
( ) tt
t
ttP
t
ttP
rπ
c
m,cu
m
m,cu
+=
∂
∂
∂
∂
, and by conditions (1) and (3), 
( )
( ) tP
t
t
t
ttP
t
ttP
t
rθ
c
c
c
m,cu
c
m,cuc
=+
∂
∂
∂
∂
− &
2
2
. Hence, 
(6) tP rθ = ; 
thus, 
(7) 
( )
( ) Pt
t
ttP
t
ttP
θπ
c
m,cu
m
m,cu
+=
∂
∂
∂
∂
  
at steady state such that 0=tc&  and 0=tk& . 
     Next, the optimization problem of a Leviathan government is examined. Let Hamiltonian 
GH  be ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tttttttG,GttGG sxgπRbλtθx,guH −−+−+−= exp , where tG,λ  is a costate 
variable. The optimality conditions for the government’s problem described above are  
(8) ( ) ( ) tG,G
t
ttG λtθ
g
x,gu −=−∂
∂ exp ,  
(9) ( ) ( ) tG,G
t
ttG λtθ
x
x,gu =−∂
∂ exp ,     
(10) ( )tttG,tG, πRλλ −−=& ,   
(11) ( ) ttttttt sxgπRbb −−+−=& , and      
(12) 0lim =∞→ ttG,t bλ .       
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Combining conditions (8), (9), and (10) yields the following equations:  
( )
( ) te tb,tttG
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
ππrπRθ
g
g
g
x,gu
g
x,gug
−+=−=+
∂
∂
∂
∂
&2
2
 and 
( )
( ) te tb,tttG
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
ππrπRθ
x
x
x
x,gu
x
x,gux
−+=−=+
∂
∂
∂
∂
− &
2
2
. 
Here, 
( )
( ) 0
2
2
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
g
g
g
x,gu
g
x,gug &  and 
( )
( ) 0
2
2
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
x
x
x
x,gu
x
x,gux &  at steady state such that 0=tg&  
and 0=tx& ; thus, te tb,tG ππrθ −+= . Because of equation (6), te tb,PG ππθθ −+=  and thus 
(13) PGt
e
tb, θθππ −+=  
at steady state such that 0=tg& , 0=tx& , 0=tc& , and 0=tk& .14   
     Equation (13) is a natural consequence of simultaneous optimization by a Leviathan 
government and the representative household. If the rates of time preference are heterogeneous 
between the government and the representative household, then t
e
tb ππ ≠, . Some may find this 
surprising because it has been naturally conjectured that t
e
tb ππ =, . However, this conjecture is a 
simple misunderstanding because, as was explained above, approximately e tbπ ,  indicates a total 
price change by inflation during a unit period such that dsdvππ
t
t
s
s v
e
b,t ∫ ∫− += 1 1 . On the other 
hand, tπ  indicates the instantaneous rate of inflation at a point such that 
t
tht
h
t
t
t p
h
pp
p
p
π
−
==
+
→0
lim& . Equation (13) therefore indicates that tπ  develops according to the 
integral equation PG
t
t
s
s vt
θθdsdvππ +−= ∫ ∫− +1 1 . The conjecture that te tb ππ =,  is true when tπ  
                                                          
14 If and only if 
t
ttt
G b
sxg
θ
−−−=  at steady state, then the transversality condition (12) 0lim =∞→ ttG,t bλ  holds. 
The proof is shown in Appendix 1. 
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is constant. Because dsdvππ
t
t
s
s v
e
b,t ∫ ∫− += 1 1 , if tπ  is constant, then the equation te tb ππ =,  
holds. If tπ  is not constant, the equation t
e
tb ππ =,  does not necessarily hold. Equation (13) 
indicates that the equation t
e
tb ππ =,  holds only in the case where PG θθ =  (i.e., a 
homogeneous rate of time preference). The equation t
e
tb ππ =,  has generally not been 
questioned probably because it has been thought that the homogeneous rate of time preference 
such that PG θθ =  naturally prevails. However, as argued above, a homogeneous rate of time 
preference is not usually guaranteed. 
 
2. The law of motion for price 
     What does equation (13) (or the integral equation PG
t
t
s
s vt
θθdsdvππ +−= ∫ ∫− +1 1 ) indicate? It 
indicates that inflation accelerates or decelerates when the rates of time preference are 
heterogeneous. If tπ  is constant, the equation dsdvπππ
t
t
s
s v
e
tb,t ∫ ∫− +== 1 1  holds; conversely, if 
dsdvπππ
t
t
s
s v
e
tb,t ∫ ∫− +=≠ 1 1 , then tπ  is not constant. Without the acceleration or deceleration of 
inflation, therefore, equation (13) cannot hold in an economy with PG θθ ≠ . That is, inflation 
accelerates or decelerates as a result of the government and the representative household 
reconciling the contradiction in heterogeneous rates of time preference. 
     Here, if PGt
t
t v
θθπdvπ −=−∫ +1 , then ( )tθθππ PGt −+= 20 . Hence, ttt ss v πdsdvπ −∫ ∫− +1 1  
0≠−= PG θθ suggests that inflation accelerates or decelerates nonlinearly such that 
( ) tzPGt tθθyππ −+= 0  where y is a constant and zt is a variable. To be precise, for a sufficiently 
small period between 1+t  and dtt ++1 , dttπ ++1  is determined with sπ  ( )11 +≤<− tst  that 
satisfies t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπ −∫ ∫− +1 1 PG θθ −= , so as to hold the equation =∫ ∫+ + dsdvπdttt ss v1  
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tdtt
dtt
t
s
s v
ππdsdvπ −+ +
+−
−
+∫ ∫11 1 . Suppose that initially PG θθ =  but Gθ  changes at time 0 and 
Gθ  and Pθ  are not identical since then. Because πt is constant before 0=t , then 
=∫ ∫− + dsdvπtt ss v1 1 ( ) 001 10 0 πdsdvππs v +−∫ ∫− + . Here, for πt to be smooth at time t = 1, it is assumed 
that ytππt += 0  for 10 <≤ t  (y is a constant). Thus ( )tθθππ PGt −+= 60  for 10 <≤ t . 
After t = 1, πt gradually departs from the path of ( )tθθππ PGt −+= 60  upward if PG θθ >  and 
downward if PG θθ <  such that 
(14) ( ) tzPGt tθθππ −+= 60  
where zt > 1, so as to hold t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπ −∫ ∫− +1 1 PG θθ −= .  
     Note that, inflation must be constant without PG θθ ≠ . It is not until being PG θθ ≠  that 
inflation can accelerate or decelerate. That is, PG θθ ≠  bends the path of inflation and makes it 
nonlinear, which enable inflation to accelerate or decelerate. The many episodes of inflation 
acceleration and disinflation across time and countries suggest that PG θθ ≠  is not rare. 
 
IV. THE OPTIMAL QUANTITY OF MONEY 
 
1. Money as a scarce resource 
     The Friedman rule requires that money should be supplied until the supply reaches the 
representative household’s saturation point. The saturation point is a point such that 
( ) 0=∂∂ t t
*
P
m
m,cu , and 0=+=+ ttPt rπθπ  by equation (7). It is possible to supply money to 
the saturation point if a government (including its central bank) is under perfect control of the 
representative household and the representative household demanding the money can supply 
money indefinitely (i.e., money is not a scarce resource for the representative household). 
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However, if a government is Leviathan economically and not under the perfect control of the 
representative household, the representative household can no longer supply money to the 
saturation point. Combining equations (7) and (14) yields the equation 
( )
( ) ( ) PzPG
t
ttP
t
ttP
θtθθπ
c
m,cu
m
m,cu
t +−+=
∂
∂
∂
∂
60  at steady state. Hence, the real quantity of money mt 
satisfies the equation such that 
(15) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )* t*PPzPG
t
t
*
P
c
m,cu
θtθθπ
m
m,cu
t
∂
∂+−+=∂
∂ 60  
at steady state, where c* is ct at steady state. 
     Equation (15) has an important implication. It indicates that, in general, ( ) 0≠∂∂ t t
*
P
m
m,cu  
because ( ) 0>∂∂ * t
*
P
c
m,cu , and the equation ( ) 060 =+−+ PzPG θtθθπ t  holds if PG θθ =  and 
000 =+=+ tP rπθπ , which is the world the Friedman rule assumes. However, as was argued 
above, it is not necessarily guaranteed a priori that equations PG θθ =  and 00 =+ trπ  hold. 
Therefore, contrary to the Friedman rule, which requires ( ) 0=∂∂ t t
*
P
m
m,cu , the quantity of 
money is not supplied up to the representative household’s saturation point. Because the 
representative household cannot supply money at will via the government, money is a scarce 
resource for the representative household and the quantity of money is instead determined 
endogenously by equation (15). Contrary to the Friedman rule, under which the quantity of 
money determines the rate of inflation, the rate of inflation determines the quantity of money 
based on equation (15). The rate of inflation is determined by equation (14), independent of the 
quantity of money.  
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2. Positive nominal interest rates  
     Equation (15) therefore implies an important nature of this simultaneous optimization of 
utility for the government and the representative household. Because ( ) 0≠∂∂ t t
*
P
m
m,cu  in 
general, then 0≠+ tt rπ  in general by condition (2); thus, the rate of return on money - tπ  is 
not necessarily equal to that on capital tr . Unlike the Friedman rule, which requires that 
0=+ tt rπ , the simultaneous optimization in this model requires that 0≠+ tt rπ  in general; 
thus, the Friedman rule should not be implemented. What should be emphasized is that this 
endogenously determined quantity of money implies positive nominal interest and inflation 
rates. Because ( ) 0>∂
∂
t
ttP
c
m,cu , 0>tP,λ  by condition (1). By equation (15), ( ) 0>∂
∂
t
ttP
m
m,cu  
at steady state if 0≥− PG θθ  and Pθπ −>0 . Here, ( ) ( ) ( )tttP,P
t
ttP rπλtθ
m
m,cu +=−∂
∂ exp  by 
condition (2). Hence, if 0≥− PG θθ  and Pθπ −>0 , then  
(16) 0>+ tt rπ   
at steady state. Inequality (16) indicates positive nominal interest rates and allows a wide range 
of positive inflation rates since it is not necessarily guaranteed to be Pθπ −≤0  a priori. 15 For 
example, assume that initially 02.00 =π , 03.0== tP rθ , and 0=− PG θθ . If both households 
                                                          
15 In addition, equation (15) predicts the negative marginal quantity of money such that 0<∂
∂
e
tb,
t
π
m  at steady state 
(the proof is shown in Appendix 2). This feature 0<∂
∂
e
tb,
t
π
m  is consistent with the feature of the well-known money 
demand function of Cagan (1956); that is, the higher the expected inflation, the lower the demand for real money. 
However, it should be noted that because inflation rates follow equation (14), given the initial inflation rate, there is 
only one path for inflation and thus the mechanism of hyperinflation that Cagan (1956) shows does not exist in this 
model.   
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and government think that this 2% inflation rate is desirable because it is sufficiently low but 
works as a buffer in case of stochastic disturbances, then the positive inflation rate 020.πt =  
and positive nominal interest rate 050.πr tt =+  will continue to hold indefinitely because 
0=− PG θθ  will not be changed. Accordingly, the unique quantity of money determined by 
equation (15) for 02.00 =π , 03.0== tP rθ , and 0=− PG θθ  is the quantity that satisfies 
( ) ( )
*
t
*
P
t
t
*
P
c
m,cu.
m
m,cu
∂
∂=∂
∂ 050 . Hence, positive inflation and nominal interest rates and the 
quantity of money that satisfies ( ) ( )
*
t
*
P
t
t
*
P
c
m,cu.
m
m,cu
∂
∂=∂
∂ 050  continue indefinitely.  
     What should be emphasized is that satisfying equation (15) is optimal even though 
equation (15) is different from the Friedman rule. The utilities of both government and the 
representative household are optimized simultaneously at the quantity of money that satisfies 
equation (15); thus, there is no room for further welfare improvement. Households demand 
money for transactions that increases their net economic utility. Equation (15) indicates that 
households demand money up to the point at which the marginal utility derived from using 
money for transactions is equal to the marginal utility of consumption multiplied by the nominal 
interest rate. If the government does not supply money to the point at which equation (15) and 
all the other conditions are satisfied, the optimality conditions for the representative household 
are violated because of the shortage of money. On the other hand, if the government supplies 
money beyond that point, the optimality conditions of government are violated because, for 
equation (15) to hold when there is an oversupply of money, the rate of inflation must be lower 
than the one the government needs for its optimization by equation (14) owing to the smaller 
( )
t
t
*
P
m
m,cu
∂
∂ . Thus, the government’s debts are compelled to explode eventually; that is, 
transversality condition (12) cannot be satisfied. Otherwise, equation (15) is not satisfied and 
the optimality conditions of the representative household are violated. Implementing the 
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Friedman rule with over-supplied money therefore means the explosion of government’s debts 
or obstruction of the optimization of the representative household. Hence, the quantity of money 
that satisfies equation (15) is optimal. 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
     The Friedman rule implicitly assumes that a government is perfectly under the control of 
the representative household; thus, in practice, the representative household that demands 
money will supply money indefinitely. Hence, the widely observed positive nominal interest 
and inflation rates conversely imply that a government is not perfectly under the control of the 
representative household but pursues its unique political objectives. In this paper, a model with 
a government that pursues its own political objectives is constructed. The main finding of the 
paper is that if a government pursues its political objectives, (i.e., if the government is 
economically Leviathan), the optimal quantity of money is generally accompanied by positive 
nominal interest and inflation rates through the simultaneous optimization of the government 
and the representative household. Money is a scarce resource for the representative household. 
The fact that nominal interest and inflation rates are usually positive is not consistent with the 
Friedman rule but is consistent with the model developed in the present paper. Conversely, this 
consistency of the model with the fact strongly implies that usually governments are 
economically Leviathans. 
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APPENDIX 
 
1. The transversality condition 
     By equation (13), t
e
tb ππ −, PGttt θθπrR −=−−=  at steady state. Hence, Gtt θπR =−  by 
equation (6). Substituting the equation Gtt θπR =−  and equation (13) into conditions (10) and 
(11) and solving both differential equations yield the equation: 
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−−−= ∫ #
t
tttttG, Cdtb
sxgbλ 1exp  at steady state where C# is a certain constant. Thereby it 
is necessary to satisfy 0<−− ttt sxg  and ∞=∫∞→ dtbtt
1lim  for the transversality condition 
(12) to be held. 
     Here, by condition (11), 
t
ttt
G
t
t
b
sxg
θ
b
b −−+=&  at steady state. Hence, if 
0=−−+=
t
ttt
G
t
t
b
sxg
θ
b
b&  at steady state, then tb  is constant; thus, ∞=∫∞→ dtbtt
1lim . Thereby, 
the transversality condition holds. However, if 0<−−+=
t
ttt
G
t
t
b
sxg
θ
b
b&  at steady state, then 
tb  diminishes to zero and transversality condition (12) cannot hold because 0<−− ttt sxg . 
If 0>−−+=
t
ttt
G
t
t
b
sxg
θ
b
b&  at steady state, then G
t
t
t
θ
b
b =
∞→
&
lim ; thus, tb  increases as time passes 
and ∫ =∞→
Gt
t θ
Cdt
b
##1lim , where C## is a certain constant. Thereby transversality condition (12) 
also cannot hold.                                                        ■ 
 
2. Proof of 0<∂
∂
e
tb,
t
π
m  
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     By equation (6), 
( )
( ) Pt
t
ttP
t
ttP
θπ
c
m,cu
m
m,cu
+=
∂
∂
∂
∂
 at steady state. Because PGt
e
tb, θθππ −+=  by 
equation (13), ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
t
ttP
GP
e
tb,
t
ttP
c
m,cu
θθπ
m
m,cu
∂
∂−+=∂
∂ 2 ; thus, ( ) ( )
t
ttP
t
e
t
t
ttP
c
m,cu
m
π
m
m,cu
∂
∂
∂
∂=∂
∂
2
2
 
at steady state. Hence, 
( )
( ) 0
2
2 <
∂
∂
∂
∂
=∂
∂
t
ttP
t
ttP
e
tb,
t
m
m,cu
c
m,cu
π
m  at steady state because ( ) 02
2
<∂
∂
t
ttP
c
m,cu  and 
( ) 0>∂
∂
t
ttP
c
m,cu .                                                         ■
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